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This paper shows that improved intergenerational risk sharing in social security may imply very
large welfare gains, amounting to up to 15 percent of the per-period consumption relative to the cur-
rent U.S. consumption. Improved risk sharing raises welfare through a direct eﬀect, i.e., by correcting
an initially ineﬃcient allocation of risk, and through a general equilibrium (GE) eﬀect. The GE eﬀect
is due to the fact that the allocation of risk in the pay-as-you-go system inﬂuences the demand for
capital. As a result, with an eﬃcient risk sharing arrangement, the crowding out eﬀect associated
with an unfunded system can actually be completely eliminated. Eﬃcient risk sharing in social secu-
rity implies highly volatile and pro-cyclical beneﬁts, i.e., that retirees’ exposure to productivity risk
is increased. Consequently, a policy involving completely safe beneﬁts will unambiguously be welfare
reducing.
JEL Classiﬁcation E21 H21 H55
Keywords:S o c i a lS e c u r i t y ,r i s ks h a r i n g
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper deals with the problem of how aggregate productivity risk should be allocated between taxpay-
ers and retirees in a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security system. The question is motivated by the fact
that overlapping generations (OLG) models are known to be ineﬃcient in an ex ante sense, stemming
from the inability of the unborn to insure themselves.1 With standard CRRA preferences and Cobb-
Douglas technology, the laissez-faire allocation of risk is ineﬃcient by imposing too little productivity
risk on retirees and too much on future generations.2
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1See Peled (1982) and Wright (1987).
2This is a very general result that will be true when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is less
than one, and/or the depreciation rate less than 100 percent. See Bohn (1998) and Bohn (2003).
1A PAYGO system has the potential of correcting these ineﬃciencies, due to the immanent intergener-
ational link found by current pension payments being immediately transferred to retirees. More precisely,
productivity risk can be transferred between taxpayers and retirees in the way beneﬁts are allowed to
respond to macroeconomic shocks. When the economy is hit by a productivity shock, the government
can keep the social security budget in balance, by adjusting beneﬁts or contributions (or, naturally, by a
combination thereof). In the former case, the exposure to productivity risk is ampliﬁed for retirees and,
in the latter case, for taxpayers. Using the PAYGO system to transfer productivity risk between these
two groups is thus straightforward.3 In the current U.S. social security system, an element of intergen-
erational risk sharing can be found in the mechanism of wage-indexed beneﬁts, implying that beneﬁts
respond to younger generations’ income.4
To analyze the importance of improved intergenerational risk sharing in social security, I set up a
three-period overlapping generations model with endogenous production, aggregate uncertainty and a
PAYGO system with simple (linear) schemes that can be used to allocate risk between taxpayers and
retirees. Speciﬁcally, wage- and capital-indexed beneﬁts are considered.5 The three-period model is
motivated on the grounds that three is the minimal number of periods that captures the heterogeneity
of consumers across age groups that I wish to emphasize: the uninsured young, the saving middle-aged
and the dissaving old. Moreover, the three-period model is needed to evaluate the eﬀects of shortselling
constraints.6 The utility function developed by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989) is used to
make the model consistent with empirically revealed attitudes towards risk.
The experiment I carry out is to ﬁnd the coeﬃcients of the schemes maximizing the expected lifetime
utility of a newborn agent, and compare the outcomes, both to the current U.S. and the social optimum.
T h ea n a l y s i st h u sq u a n t i ﬁes the importance of obtaining a better intergenerational risk sharing allocation,
and it sheds lights on the way beneﬁts and taxes should respond to macroeconomic shocks. I also model
3However, the suboptimality of the risk allocation in the existing U.S. social security system has been discussed in several
recent papers, including Shiller (1998), Ball and Mankiw (2001) and Abel (2003).
4An individual’s earnings are indexed to the average wage level 2 years prior to the year of eligibility, i.e., when the agent
reaches the age of 62.
5The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form, implying that the arrangement with wage-indexed
beneﬁts is identical to one where beneﬁts are indexed to aggregate income.
6More speciﬁcally, the two-period model imposes implicit short-selling constraints. For instance, in that setting, the
young can never take a short position in capital unless some institution (for example the government) takes a long position
in capital. The case is similar for bondholdings since, in equilibrium, the young must hold the whole amount of government
debt, thereby also implying a long position in bonds.
2unexpected transitions from the current U.S. economy to the eﬃcient equilibria, and compute the implied
welfare eﬀects.
The ﬁndings are that improved risk sharing in social security may imply very large welfare gains.
The welfare gain of being born into an economy with eﬃcient wage-indexation is between 12 and almost
15 percent of per-period consumption in the current U.S., depending on whether agents are subject to
shortselling constraints. In contrast, the welfare loss of being born into the ineﬃcient economy with
completely safe beneﬁts is roughly 10 percent of the per-period consumption. Hence, welfare eﬀects are,
by all means, very large. Eﬃcient risk sharing in social security implies highly volatile and pro-cyclical
beneﬁts and tax rates. The pro-cyclical arrangement eases the risk exposure of the young, since they are
subject to lower taxes in bad states and vice versa. In this way, social security provides some insurance
to the uninsured young. Highly volatile beneﬁts are motivated by the fact that the allocation of risk
in the PAYGO system has a major inﬂuence on demand for capital. More speciﬁcally, highly volatile
beneﬁts strengthen the precautionary savings motive of the middle-aged agents. As a result, they save
more and hold more capital to hedge their coming volatile beneﬁts. In fact, in the absence of shortselling
constraints, the crowding out eﬀect generally associated with an unfunded system can be completely
eliminated by the use of eﬃcient risk sharing arrangements. The welfare eﬀects of improved risk sharing
in social security can thus be decomposed into a direct welfare eﬀect and a general equilibrium (GE) eﬀect.
The direct welfare eﬀect raises welfare by correcting an initially ineﬃcient allocation of risk, whereas the
welfare eﬀects stemming from the GE eﬀect are due to the higher average level of the capital stock.7 The
welfare gains associated with the risk allocations analyzed in this paper are highly correlated with the
capital stock, indicating that the major part of the welfare gain associated with improved risk sharing
actually comes from the GE eﬀect.
Ia l s oﬁnd a considerable diﬀerence between the social optimum and all other economies, including the
laissez-faire economy. Despite the large welfare gains associated with improved risk sharing, no economy
actually comes close to the social optimum. The capital stock in the social optimum is roughly 3.5 times
the capital stock in the laissez-faire economy, indicating that the social planner builds up a very large
7The fact that social security may be used to change national saving and investment is also discussed in Abel (2003).
3buﬀer to be able to smooth the consumption of future generations.
An intuition for the ﬁndings in this paper is that the welfare cost of exposing the old to aggregate
risk is relatively small, as long as the risk is predictable and known in advance. The reason is that the
old have had a lifetime for setting up their hedging portfolios. In contrast, the earlier in life agents are
exposed to risk, the smaller are their possibilities to hedge.
The benchmark model is calibrated to be consistent with the risk free rate, the Sharpe ratio and
the capital output ratio in the U.S. However, since the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (RRA) is
controversial, a sensitivity experiment is also carried out to evaluate the importance of this parameter.
In this exercise, CRRA utility is used and the RRA coeﬃcient is set to 2, while the rest of the calibration
is kept constant. In every important aspect, the results are very similar to those found with Epstein-Zin
utility. The welfare eﬀects are still substantial, indicating that even if agents are only moderately risk
averse, they still care a great deal about the allocation of risk, mainly because of the large GE eﬀects at
stake.
The results in this paper are closely related to earlier ﬁndings on intergenerational risk sharing. First,
they are in line with the ﬁndings of Storesletten et al. (1998) and Krueger and Kubler (2002), who both
ﬁnd the major part of the (negative) welfare eﬀects associated with social security to come from general
equilibrium eﬀects (i.e., it crowds out capital). Second, the ﬁnding of pro-cyclical beneﬁts and taxes
resembles the ﬁndings in Smetters (2002), where it is shown that the government can use negative capital
income taxes (implying pro-cyclical wage taxes) to correct the ”biological trading constraint” preventing
living generations from negotiating contingent contracts with the unborn. These are also in line with
Bohn (1998, 2003) who ﬁnd the young in OLG models to be generally to exposed to aggregate risk.
This paper abstracts from population growth, demographic uncertainty, labor supply decisions, debt
policy and preferences motivating a PAYGO system. Admittedly, these are all potentially important
issues. For instance, it would be more realistic to consider an endogenous labor supply, since that would
give the young one more degree of freedom. However, as shown by Olovsson (2004a), the response in labor
supply to a tax increase will, to a large extent, depend on whether agents also work in home production.
Introducing home production signiﬁcantly complicates the analysis. Debt policy is, of course, a natural
4candidate for handling issues of risk sharing. The question is then how to construct the debt policy
response function in an eﬃcient way. When hit by a bad productivity shock, the government can either
increase the debt and provide safe beneﬁts to the old, or keep it constant and reduce beneﬁts. However,
due to the general similarities between unfunded social security and debt, the use of debt as an instrument
to handle risk sharing can in every relevant aspect be expected to resemble one using the PAYGO system.
M o s ti m p o r t a n tm i g h tb et h ef a c tt h a ti ti sd i ﬃcult to provide a rational for the PAYGO system using
standard preferences. However, Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2003) show that in a model with standard
preferences, a PAYGO system of realistic size may be introduced and sustained in a political equilibrium.
2 The Economic Model
2.1 The Consumers
The basic model is a three-period overlapping generations model. Each generation is modeled as a
representative consumer. There is one consumption good in each period and it perishes at the end of the
period. The index i =0 ,1 and 2 is used to denote the young, the middle-aged and the old, respectively.
An agent inelastically supplies labor for two periods and retires in the third period when old. During
their working years, agents are endowed with a level of productivity ei and they receive wage W.W h e n
retired, they collect the social security beneﬁt, e ϕt.
There are two types of securities in the economy, bonds and capital denoted by b and k, respectively.
Bonds are assumed to be in zero net supply, while the supply of capital is endogenous. A consumer born in
period t has zero endowment of assets. This consumer makes a portfolio decision at+1,0 =( bt+1,0,k t+1,0)
in period t, when young; adjusts this decision to at+2,1 =( bt+2,1,k t+2,1) in period t +1 ,w h e nm i d d l e -
aged; and sells the portfolio in period t +2 , when old. As usual, a negative position in bonds or stocks
denotes a short position in that asset. The price of the bond and the gross rate of return on capital are
denoted by p and R, respectively, and the tax rate is denoted by τt. The budget constraints in period t
are then given by
5ct,0 ≤ (1 − τt)e0Wt − kt+1,0 − ptbt+1,0 (1)
ct,1 ≤ (1 − τt)e1Wt + Rtkt,0 + bt,0 − kt+1,1 − ptbt+1,1 (2)
ct,2 ≤ e ϕt + Rtkt,1 + bt,1, (3)
where (1), (2) and (3) are the budget constraints faced by the period t young, middle-aged and old,
respectively.
Since this paper is concerned with the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent risk allocations, it is important to use
preferences that are, at least in principle, consistent with empirically revealed attitudes towards risk. It
is well known that there is no way of ﬁtting both the level of the risk-free rate and the risk premium with
standard preferences (i.e., with power utility).8 The more ﬂexible utility function developed by Epstein
and Zin (1989,1991) and Weil (1989) will therefore be used instead. If we denote the subjective discount













where θ is deﬁned by θ =( 1− γ)/[1 − (1/σ)], γ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and σ is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Note that when γ =1 /σ, i.e., when θ =1 , (4) collapses to the
standard time-separable power utility function with relative risk aversion, γ.
Finally, the following assumption is made:
Ut,i ≡ 0 for i ≥ 3,
which implies that the old do not buy any assets (and that altruistic bequests are ruled out). The
8By construction, the basic power utility model makes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution the reciprocal of the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. This is restrictive, since no theoretical or empirical evidence supports such a tight link
between these two concepts. The strength of the Epstein-Zin-Weil model is that it allows us to break this link.
6maximization problem of an agent aged i ∈ {0,1} is then














There is a representative ﬁrm, which in each period uses labor and capital to produce the consumption
good, according to a constant returns to scale production function. Since ﬁrms make their decision on
how much capital and labor to hire after the realization of shock Zt, they face no uncertainty and simply
maximize their current-period proﬁts. The aggregate production function takes the form
Yt = ZtKα
t L1−α, (6)
where Zt is a stochastic productivity shock, Kt the aggregate capital stock and L the aggregate labor
supply.
In order to allow the total return on capital to vary somewhat independently from the wage rate, I
assume a stochastic depreciation rate. Given aggregate consumption C, and the rate of depreciation on
aggregate capital δ, the law of motion for aggregate capital is given by
Kt+1 = Yt − Ct +( 1− δt)Kt. (7)
2.3 The Government Sector
The government administrates a PAYGO social security system, i.e. it collects taxes from workers and
pays out social security beneﬁts to the retired. In the current U.S. social security system, there are
basically three important factors determining the social security beneﬁts received by an agent: his/hers
average income, the replacement ratio and the evolvement of average wages. The ﬁrst is important
because the level of beneﬁts when reaching the retirement age is based on lifetime earnings. However,
for computational ease, I will not base beneﬁts on agents’ income histories, but instead on the average
7labor income in the economy.9 This average is denoted by W =
(e0+e1)
2 E [W],w h e r eE [W] is the
unconditional expected long-run wage rate in the stationary economy (and e0 and e1 are once more
age-speciﬁc productivities).
The second determinant of the social security beneﬁts is the replacement ratio η, i.e. the rate at which
social security replaces past earnings. In a world without uncertainty, the social security beneﬁtw o u l d
thus be given by
ϕ = ηW. (8)
However, beneﬁts are also related to the aggregate wage-index, i.e., the evolvement of aggregate labor
income. More speciﬁcally, an individual’s earnings are indexed to the average wage level at the time of
retirement.10 The variability of the aggregate wage rate thus inﬂuences the variability of beneﬁts. The
period t beneﬁtc a nt h e nﬁnally be speciﬁed by the following two equations
e ϕt = a0ϕ + aw
Wt
E [W]
ϕ ,( 9 )
and
a0 + aw =1 . (10)
The wage-indexation scheme speciﬁed by the two equations (9) and (10) constitutes an easy way of
transferring aggregate (wage) risk between agents participating in the social security system.11 Equation
(10) implies that unconditional expected beneﬁts always equal ηW.12 T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h i se q u a t i o n
is to ensure that only risk is transferred between taxpayers and retirees. In this paper, I am concerned
with the welfare gains of improving risk sharing in social security, and violating (10) would shift the focus
away from the issue of risk sharing to that of the optimal size of social security. This is obviously an
9This assumption can be viewed as a rough ﬁrst approximation to the highly redistributive nature of the actual link
between actual earnings and beneﬁts. The assumption signiﬁcantly eases the computational burden as individuals’ income
histories are not needed as state variables. Finally, Olovsson (2004b) shows that these histories are not really quantitatively
important.
10Actually, an individual’s earnings are indexed to the average wage level 2 years prior to the year of eligibility, i.e., when
the agent reaches the age of 62.
11The notation in (9) is chosen to illustrate that the beneﬁt ϕ consists of a safe part and a risky part.
12However, no further restrictions are placed on a0 and aw.
8important issue, but beyond the scope of this paper.
When aw =0 ,b e n e ﬁts are completely safe, in the sense that all productivity risk in social security
is solely borne by the tax payers. This risk can then be shifted to the retirees, and arbitrarily increased
by increasing aw. Following Bohn (1998), the current U.S. social security system is modeled by setting
aw =1 .B e n e ﬁts thus respond to aggregate wages with a factor of 1.
It may also be interesting to consider the alternative with capital-indexed beneﬁts. In a world where
aggregate uncertainty hits the economy according to (6), and the returns to labor and capital are perfectly
correlated, the scheme given by (9) would in every aspect be equivalent to one where beneﬁts are indexed
to capital income or aggregate income. In the long run, labor and capital returns are indeed highly
positively correlated in the U.S. and other OECD countries.13 However, a stochastic depreciation rate
was introduced in the previous section to make it possible for the total return on capital to vary somewhat
independently from the wage rate. To analyze the implications of a PAYGO scheme where beneﬁts are
instead indexed to the total return on capital, I here introduce the following alternative function




which must once more be combined with (10).
Finally, the government is required to balance its budget in each period. Since the government bond
is in zero net supply, the government budget constraint is given by
e ϕt = τtLWt. (12)
2.4 Shortselling Constraints
Shortselling constraints may be a potentially important issue, since they restrict agents to smooth con-
sumption across states. More speciﬁcally, shortselling constraints prevent agents from borrowing against
their future income, when facing a bad shock. Agents may therefore ﬁnd the allocation of risk in so-
cial security more important when subject to shortselling constraints restricting them in their ﬁnancial
13Baxter and Jermann (1997).
9behavioral. Most likely, these constraints are most severe for the uninsured young. Both cases with
and without shortselling constraints will therefore be considered. A shortselling constraint can purely be
motivated on realistic grounds: it is a well known fact that human capital alone does not collateralize
major loans in modern economies (for reasons of moral hazard and adverse selection).
The shortselling constraints are given by
bt+1,i ≥ 0,k t+1,i ≥ 0 i =0 ,1,2.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium
I am now searching for a stationary equilibrium where decisions made in a given period are determined
by the aggregate shock sj =( Zj,δj), sj ∈ S, the aggregate capital stock K and the current wealth
of the middle-aged a−1 =( b−1,k −1).14 An equilibrium can be deﬁned to consist of market clearing
prices R, W and p and a set of age-speciﬁc functions k0
0 = k0 (s,K,a−1);b0
0 = b0 (s,K,a−1) and k0
1 =
k1 (s,K,a−1);b0
1 = b1 (s,K,a−1) such that













i=0 satisﬁes equations (5)










(4) The government budget constraint (12) is satisﬁed with equality.
(5) The resource constraint (7) holds with equality.
All the above conditions should be considered as standard.
3.2 The Command Optimum
To properly evaluate diﬀerent equilibria, the social optimum needs to be solved for. This optimum gives
us the best possible outcome and is therefore a natural benchmark case. The social planner’s problem is









subject to the resource constraint (7) and where the initial capital stock K0 and the past consumption of
the middle-aged and old ct−1,0; ct−1,1; ct−2,0 are given. The planner is assumed to use a constant discount
factor equal to the agents’ subjective discount factor. Because utilities are evaluated in expectation, the
allocation will be eﬃcient ex ante, contingent on the initial conditions. There is some controversy in
the literature about ex ante versus interim eﬃciency.15 Under an interim perspective, agents born in
diﬀerent states of nature are considered to be distinct. A Pareto improvement will then require that no
birth-contingent agent in any birth state is made worse oﬀ. For the purpose of this paper, i.e. policy
analysis, interim eﬃciency is rather uninteresting, since policies almost always shift resources across states
of nature and are therefore not comparable by interim standards.





















The ﬁrst equation is, in the words of Bohn (1998), ”the distributional optimality conditions” linking
the consumption of the agents alive in period t. The second equation is ”the intertemporal optimality
condition” which reveals how the planner allocates resources over time. Equation (18) is actually identical
to the individual optimality condition for savings (i.e., the Euler equation). In contrast, however, the
eﬃciency condition (17) is generally not satisﬁed by the market allocation.16 For time-separable utility,
for example, (17) calls for a deterministic link between the contemporaneous consumption of all agents
a l i v ei nag i v e np e r i o d .
4 Computation of the Equilibrium
I use a spline collocation algorithm to numerically approximate the equilibrium. The strength of the three-
period model is twofold: (i) it is suﬃciently rich to allow agents to intergenerationally share risk and (ii)
it allows me to rely on standard techniques when solving for the equilibrium. To solve their optimization
problems, agents need to keep track of the aggregate capital stock, the (constant) net supply of bonds
and the wealth of the middle aged (alternatively, the wealth of the old)
k0,t−1 (1 + rK)+b0,t−1 | {z }
Wealth of the mid-aged
+ k1,t−1 (1 + rK)+b1,t−1 | {z }
Wealth of the old
= K (1 + rK)+B. (19)
The approximation of the equilibrium is therefore straightforward.
A more serious challenge is the numerical computation of the social optimum. Generally, the social
optimum is easier to compute than the decentralized equilibrium. With Epstein-Zin preferences, however,
one also needs to keep track of consumption histories. I approximate this equilibrium by using the
aggregate capital stock, the period t−1 consumption of the currently mid-aged and a variable summarizing
16See Bohn (1998) for a more profound discussion.
12the consumption history of the currently old as state variables. The result is a very large state space,
consisting of three continuous endogenous state variables. In addition, the system of equations shows a
very high degree of curvature (θ is equal to -51 with the chosen calibration, thereby implying that some
equations are raised to the power of -52).17
5 Calibration
5.1 Income Proﬁles and Social Security
T h ea v e r a g es h a r eo fw a g ei n c o m eg o i n gt ot h ey o u n ge0
e1. Recall that the productivity of the
young and the old, respectively, is given by e0 and e1. Labor endowments are deterministic and set so
that e0
e1 =0 .70. This is basically consistent with the estimates from PSID data in Storesletten et al.
(2003).
The expected replacement rate η. In the U.S., the current payroll tax is 12.4 percent, and beneﬁts
replace 43.7 percent of the average pre-taxed wage.18 However, up to 85 percent of the received beneﬁts
may also be subject to income tax. Since I do not want to put any restrictions on the possible allocations
of risk between taxpayers and retirees, I will not assume beneﬁts to be taxable.19 Instead, I set η =0 .4,
in the sense of beneﬁts replacing 40 percent of the (unconditional expected) average life-time after-tax
wage in the economy. This corresponds to a replacement ratio of 43.7 percent of the average pre-taxed
wage, where roughly 50 percent of the received beneﬁts are subject to income tax.
5.2 Aggregate uncertainty
Aggregate productivity is assumed to be driven by a four-state Markov process with state space S =
[s1,s 2,s 3,s 4] and the transition probability matrix π =( πij).20 An aggregate state is characterized by a
TFP shock, and a depreciation rate sj =( Zj,δj), sj ∈ S. The four states are in order
17Due to the high degree of curvature, a tensor product approach to the three-dimensional approximation is called for.
The total number of unknowns then becomes: the No. of gridpoints times the No. of exogenous states times the No. of
endogenous variables. Even with a simple 10x10x10 grid and 4 states, the total number of unknowns becomes 12000.
18See, for example, Mchale (1999).
19Obviously, if beneﬁts are taxable, both workers and retirees will be equally exposed to tax risk.
20This assumption implies that markets are somewhat incomplete. The setting is needed to account for a high, but not
perfect, correlation between return to capital and return to labor.
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where δ is the average depreciation rate.21 Is e tδ =0 .626, implying the average annual depreciation rate
to be between 4 and 5 percent.22 The stochastic process is assumed to be i.i.d. over time. Although it
is well established that aggregate productivity shocks are highly autocorrelated at annual and quarterly
frequencies, there does not seem to exist any conclusive evidence indicating such positive serial correlation
at generational frequencies (i.e. 20-30 year periods).23 As a benchmark, aggregate shocks are therefore
assumed to be uncorrelated across time.
With the above representation, the aggregate state s1 is characterized by a bad TFP shock and a
b a dd e p r e c i a t i o ns h o c kw h e r e a ss4 is given by a good TFP shock, and a good depreciation shock. In
aggregate states s2 and s3, the TFP shock and the depreciation shocks move in opposite directions. It is
also assumed that π1 = π4 and π2 = π3.
In order to pin down v,ζ and π1, I set out to match the following statistics.24
The coeﬃcient of variation of the 20-year aggregate income,
σ(y)
E(y). It is is rather problematic
to calibrate this statistic, due to the fact that even a century-long time series only provides ﬁve non-
overlapping observations, resulting in large standard errors of the point estimates. I follow Constantinides
et al. (1998),a n ds e tt h ec o e ﬃcient of variation of the 20-year aggregate income to 0.2.
The coeﬃcient of variation of the 20-year aggregate capital,
σ(K)
E(K). Capital in this model is
not just a claim to corporate dividends, but to all risky capital in the economy. According to Baxter and
Jermann (1997), the return to labor is less volatile than the return to capital. In the U.S., the volatility
of the return to labor is estimated to be 85 percent of the volatility of the return to capital. Lacking a
21The four aggregate states are somewhat asymmetric since this setup makes the numerical computation of the social
optimum somewhat simpler. However, the results are not sensitive to the asymmetric setup.
22As in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
23This assumption is also in line with several other papers dealing with OLG-models with two or three periods. See, for
instance, Bohn (1999), Kreuger and Kubler (2002) and Smetters (2002).
24Very roughly, ν determines the variation of aggregate income, ς determines the variation of aggregate capital and π1
determines the correlation between returns to labor and capital. The calibration procedure involved a simple grid search
algorithm.




E(y) , which makes the model consistent with that estimate.25
The cross-correlation of aggregate labor income and aggregate capital income corr(wt,R t).
According to Baxter and Jermann (1997) and Bohn (1999), the return to capital, and the return to labor
are highly correlated in the long run. With these ﬁndings in mind, Is e tcorr(wt,R t)=0 .9.
5.3 Preferences
Since this paper is concerned with the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent allocations of risk, it is important to assign
values to the preference parameters that actually reﬂect households’ attitudes to risk. The preference
parameters in the model are the RRA coeﬃcient γ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of intertemporal substitution σ,a n d
t h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rβ. To calibrate these preference parameters, I set out to make the model
consistent with the following empirical ﬁndings:
The annualized capital output ratio K
Y . This statistic is calibrated to be 3.3, which is the number
reported in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
The average annual real risk free rate rf. The risk free rate varies over time so it is not really
obvious what is a reasonable level for the safe real rate. When Mehra and Prescott announced the
existence of a equity premium puzzle in 1985, they found the average riskless real interest rate to be 0.8
percent for the period 1947-1976.26 Since the mid-eighties, however, the average real risk free rate has
been somewhat higher than in the period studied by Mehra and Prescott. According to Campbell (1999),
the average real risk free rate was 1.955 percent for the period 1891-1995.27
The Sharpe ratio,
E[rk]−rf
std(rk) . Since in the model, capital is not just a claim to corporate dividends
but to all risky capital in the economy, I do not try to match the observed equity premium, the reason, of
course, being that equity returns are much more volatile than capital return. Instead, I set out to match
the Sharpe ratio, which in this case is the risk premium households demand for holding risky capital,
divided by the standard deviation of the return to capital. Constantinides et al. (2002) report data on
20-year holding period real returns and standard deviations for bonds and equity. The implied Sharpe
25Due to the Cobb-Douglas technology, aggregate income and labor income are equally volatile.
26Mehra and Prescott (1985).






, since a period is assumed to be 20 years.
15ratio can then be calculated to 1.65.
Is e tγ =1 8 , σ =0 .75 and β =0 .68, which generates an annualized capital ratio of 3.3, an interest
rate of 1.85 and a Sharpe ratio of 1.61 in the model without borrowing constraints and 1.67 in the model
with borrowing constraints.28 A β equal to 0.68 corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.98. To
sum up, technology and preference parameters are set to
Table 1: PRODUCTION AND PREFERENCE PARAMETERS
vζ π 1 βγσ
0.295 0.274 0.175 0.68 18 0.75
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Long-Run Equilibria
Results are presented in this section. All results presented in table 2 are expressed in relation to the
current U.S. economy and, consequently, the capital stock and the welfare gain of being born into this
economy are both normalized to 1.29 Welfare gains are expressed from the perspective of an unborn agent.
More precisely, a welfare gain of x percent of being born into a speciﬁc economy implies that the per-period
consumption in the present U.S. must be increased by x percent, for the agent to be indiﬀerent between
being born into these two economies. Wage-Index* and Capital-Index* refer to economies with optimized
indexation with respect to wages and capital, respectively. The laissez-faire economy is characterized by
the absence of a state, taxes and thus, social security.
I summarize the results as follows.
• General equilibrium eﬀects are substantial. First, the capital stock in the laissez-faire econ-
omy is roughly 64 percent higher than in the current U.S., implying the crowding out eﬀect to
be 39 percent. Interestingly, this is very close to the empirical estimate of 38 percent in Feld-
28Once more, very roughly, β determines the capital output ratio, σ determines the risk-free rate and γ determines the
Sharpe ratio.
29All economies are simulated for 10 000 periods.
16Table 2: CAPITAL STOCK AND WELFARE GAINS
SHORTSELLING NO SHORTSELLING
E [K] WELFARE GAIN E [K] WELFARE GAIN
U . S . 1111
SAFE BENEFITS 0.9 -10.09 0.95 -9.29
WAGE-INDEX* 1.69 14.86 1.46 12.09
CAPITAL-INDEX* 1.71 13.83 1.40 9.41
LAISSEZ-FAIRE 1.64 19.89 1.63 19.59
SOCIAL OPTIMUM 5.8 50.88 6.3 52.19
stein (1974).30 Second, the allocation of risk in the PAYGO system heavily inﬂuences the demand
for capital. In the absence of shortselling constraints, the capital stock is actually higher under
optimized wage and capital-indexation than in the laissez-faire illustrating that the crowding out
eﬀect can be completely eliminated. However, welfare is still higher in the laissez-faire economy, at
least partially as a result of the fact that agents in the economies with social security are forced
to service the debt associated with providing an unfunded transfer to the initial generations (those
who were retired when the system was introduced), whereas this is not the case for agents in the
laissez-faire.31 Finally, wage-indexation seems to be slightly preferable to capital-indexation. Recall
that in an OLG settings, it is the young that need to be insured and the risk they are facing is
wage-risk.
• Welfare eﬀects are very large. By all standards, the welfare gains associated with the diﬀerent
economies are huge. Welfare gains are also obviously very highly correlated with the size of the
capital stock, indicating that the major part of the welfare gain associated with improved risk
sharing actually comes from the GE eﬀect. These results are thus in line with the ﬁndings of
30More speciﬁcally, Feldstein uses U.S. data for the period 1929 through 1971 to assess how the introduction and growth
of social security have aﬀected aggregate personal savings and the national accumulation of capital. See also Feldstein
(1996).
31The welfare gains of the laissez-faire economy should therefore be corrected for these transfer eﬀects for it to be the
relevant object of comparison (as in Storesletten et al. (1999)).
17Storesletten et. al (1998) and Krueger and Kubler (2002), who both ﬁnd the major part of the
(negative) welfare eﬀects associated with social security to come from general equilibrium eﬀects
(i.e., it crowds out capital). Finally, welfare eﬀects are of similar magnitude, irrespective of whether
agents are subject to shortselling constraints. Thus, there seems to be no support for the view that
the allocation of risk in social security is without importance, when agents can trade in several
assets. On the contrary, welfare eﬀects are actually somewhat higher in the absence of shortselling
constraints.
• Safe beneﬁts are signiﬁcantly worse than the status quo. The welfare loss of being born into
an economy with safe beneﬁts is rather large: roughly 10 percent of per-period consumption. This
welfare loss is due to the fact that the regime with safe beneﬁts implies that the direct welfare eﬀect
and the GE welfare eﬀects are both negative. The direct welfare eﬀect is obviously negative, since
safe beneﬁts require contra-cyclical taxes, which inevitably increases the exposure of the young to
aggregate risk.32 The GE eﬀect is also negative, since the capital stock is signiﬁcantly lower under
t h er e g i m eo fs a f eb e n e ﬁts.
• A considerable diﬀerence between the social optimum and other economies, including
the laissez-faire. The capital stock in the social optimum is roughly 3.5 times the capital stock
in the laissez-faire economy, indicating that the social planner builds up a very large buﬀer to be
able to smooth the consumption of future generations. Consequently, the welfare gain of being born
into the social optimum is also considerably larger than the gain of being born into the laissez-faire
economy. These results illustrate the quantitative importance of ex ante ineﬃciency, and they show
that agents actually ﬁnd the risk of being born into the wrong state a serious issue.
6.2 The Allocation of Risk
Table 3 gives the optimal coeﬃcients of the respective schemes (i.e., equations (9) and (11)). The
coeﬃcients are all positive, thereby implying that beneﬁts, as well as taxes, should be pro-cyclical. This
32A ss t a t e di nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o n ,t h ey o u n ga r ea l r e a d yt o oe x p osed to aggregate risk in the decentralized equilibrium
when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption is less than 1 (see Bohn (1998)).
18Table 3: Coeﬃcients for eﬃcient risk sharing
NO SHORTSELLING SHORTSELLING
WAGE-INDEX* aw =4 .39 aw =4 .28
CAPITAL-INDEX* ak =2 .72 ak =3 .0
arrangement eases the risk exposure of the young, since they are subject to lower taxes in bad states,
and vice versa. Social security thus provides some insurance to the uninsured young. As a contrast, the
regime with safe beneﬁts calls for contra-cyclical taxes which increase the risk exposure of the young, since
they are forced to pay higher taxes in bad states. These results resemble the ﬁndings of Smetters (2002),
who shows that the government can use negative capital income taxes (implying pro-cyclical wage taxes),
to correct the ”biological trading constraint” preventing living generations from negotiating contingent
contracts with the unborn.33 These are also in line with Bohn (1998, 2003) who ﬁnd the young in OLG
models to be generally exposed to aggregate risk.34
In addition, the coeﬃcients are all much larger than 1. Highly volatile beneﬁts strengthen the pre-
cautionary savings motive of the middle-aged agents. As a result, they save more and hold more capital
to hedge their coming volatile beneﬁts. This is illustrated in Fig. 1, where capital demand is plotted as a
function of aw when agents are subject to shortselling constraints. Capital demand by the young is basi-
cally constant, whereas capital demand by the middle-aged is strictly increasing in aw.M a y b es o m e w h a t
surprising, the magnitude of the respective coeﬃcients in table 3 is very much the same, irrespective of
whether agents are subject to shortselling constraints.
Since the value of the RRA coeﬃcient is controversial, I carry out a sensitivity experiment in the
Appendix with respect to this parameter. Instead of Epstein-Zin preferences, power utility (CRRA) is







33A negative capital tax is valid when production takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the depreciation rate is less than 100
percent, and the intertemporal substitution elasticity is equal to one.
34Moreover, Bohn ﬁnds wage-indexed social security (i.e. aw =1 ) to be a neutral policy, implying that aw must be larger
than 1 to correct the ineﬃcient outcome.
19Figure 1: ASSET DEMAND WHEN SHORT-SELLING IS NOT ALLOWED
where γ is set equal to 2. The rest of the parameters are kept constant, however (only the case with
short selling constraints is considered). Comparing table 2 and table 5 in the Appendix, we see that the
results from this exercise with a more moderate RRA coeﬃcient are very similar to those presented above.
The actual numbers are somewhat changed but basically, all the main ﬁndings above still go through.
GE eﬀects are very large, welfare eﬀects are substantial, safe beneﬁts generate the worst outcome and
there is still a substantial diﬀerence between the social optimum and all other economies, including the
laissez-faire. This result indicates that even if agents are only moderately risk averse, they still care a
great deal about the allocation of risk, mainly because of the large GE eﬀects at stake.
Finally, if agents are less risk averse, they respond less to changes in the allocation of risk. As a result,
to generate GE eﬀects, beneﬁts must be made even more volatile than with Epstein-Zin utility (compare
table 3 with table 6 in the Appendix).
206.3 Transitions
In this section, I carry out unexpected transitions from the current U.S. to the diﬀerent economies. The
results are presented in table 4.35




SAFE BENEFITS -4.29 -5.16
WAGE-INDEX* -1.62 -0.51
CAPITAL-INDEX* 0.6 -0.13
LAISSEZ FAIR 3.17 2.14
SOCIAL OPTIMUM 8.59 9.38
Almost all welfare gains are turned into losses when the transition is considered. The main explanation
is that since these transitions are unexpected, the agents alive at the introduction of the new regimes
are taken from a relatively safe environment and placed in a much more risky one, without a chance of
hedging themselves against this new risk. The long-run gains found in the previous section rest upon the
notion that productivity risk should be predictable and placed upon those agents who actually have the
possibility of hedging this risk (i.e., the old). In the unexpected transitions, these hedging possibilities
are simply not just there, obviously resulting in welfare losses.
However, since the welfare gains found in the previous section are so large, there should be some way of
extracting these gains, by choosing a more sophisticated transition policy. There are several possibilities
from which to choose. The most straightforward way is probably just to announce the transition several
periods in advance. Another possibility could be that the government hedges the ﬁrst generations in the
transition to some degree, either by going into debt, or decumulating a buﬀer they have built up a before
the transition. I leave this for future research.
35Results are averaged over 100 randomly chosen initial allocations in the benchmark economy called the U.S.
217C o n c l u s i o n s
The importance of improved risk sharing in social security has been analyzed. The ﬁndings are that
improved risk sharing in social security may imply very large welfare gains. The welfare gain of being
born into an economy with eﬃcient wage-indexation is between 12 and almost 15 percent of per-period
consumption in the current U.S., depending on whether agents are subject to shortselling constraints.
In contrast, the welfare loss of being born into the ineﬃcient economy with completely safe beneﬁts is
roughly 10 percent of the per-period consumption. Eﬃcient risk sharing in social security implies highly
volatile and pro-cyclical beneﬁts and tax rates. The pro-cyclical arrangement eases the risk exposure of
the young, since they they are subject to lower taxes in bad states and vice versa. In this way, social
security provides some insurance to the uninsured young. Highly volatile beneﬁts are motivated by the
fact that the allocation of risk in the PAYGO system has a major inﬂuence on demand for capital.
More speciﬁcally, highly volatile beneﬁts strengthen the precautionary savings motive of the middle-aged
agents. As a result, they save more and hold more capital to hedge their coming volatile beneﬁts. In fact,
in the absence of shortselling constraints, the crowding out eﬀect generally associated with an unfunded
system can be completely eliminated by the use of eﬃcient risk sharing arrangements. The welfare gains
associated with the risk allocations analyzed in this paper are highly correlated with the capital stock,
indicating that the major part of the welfare gain associated with improved risk sharing actually comes
from the GE eﬀect.
Ia l s oﬁnd a considerable diﬀerence between the social optimum and all other economies, including the
laissez-faire economy. Despite the large welfare gains associated with improved risk sharing, no economy
actually comes close to the social optimum. The capital stock in the social optimum is roughly 3.5 times
the capital stock in the laissez-faire economy, indicating that the social planner builds up a very large
buﬀer to be able to smooth the consumption of future generations.
An intuition for the ﬁndings in this paper is that the welfare cost of exposing the old to aggregate
risk is relatively small, as long as the risk is predictable and known in advance. The reason is that the
old have had a lifetime for setting up their hedging portfolios. In contrast, the earlier in life agents are
exposed to risk, the smaller are their possibilities to hedge.
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AA p p e n d i x
A.1 A Sensitivity Experiment
A.1.1 The Case of CRRA Utility
In this section, the RRA coeﬃcient is set to 2, in order to evaluate the importance of this parameter.
Except for this change, the rest of the calibration is kept constant. Only the case with short selling
constraints is considered. The results are presented in tables 5a n d6 .
25Table 5: CAPITAL STOCK AND WELFARE GAINS, RRA=2
NO SHORTSELLING
E [K] WELFARE GAIN
U.S. 1 1




SOCIAL OPTIMUM 3.03 43.90
Table 6: Coeﬃcients for eﬃcient risk sharing, RRA=2
NO SHORTSELLING
WAGE-INDEX* aw =6 .43
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